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Organizational Learning in a High-Risk
Environment: Responding to an Anthrax
Outbreak
Abstract

Shari R. Veil and Timothy L. Sellnow

The National Center for Food Protection and Defense, a
Department of Homeland Security-sponsored Center of Excellence,
identified and endorses 10 best practices for risk and crisis
communication. The best practices model is designed to aid
organizations of all types in preparing for and learning from crisis
events. This analysis applied the best practices model to a case study
of an anthrax outbreak that fostered a full-blown crisis response. This
study analyzes the learning experience of the crisis cohort group that
responded to the crisis. The researchers contend that by evaluating
a crisis situation using best practices as a benchmarking procedure,
problems within the system and new strategies can be identified.

{

So What?
Evaluating best practices allows an organization to learn
from failures and crises by establishing alternative strategies.
This case study can serve not only as an example of how to
use the best practices in risk and crisis communication in a
postcrisis review, but also as a vicarious learning tool for how
to plan an effective crisis response.

Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the belief that terrorism only
happens “over there” changed dramatically. The Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) was established and other government agencies were
restructured in order to confront an array of threats, including nuclear
activity, suicide bombers, biological weapons, and attacks on the nation’s
communication systems (Wilcox & Cameron, 2006). Reallocating funds
to guard against specific threats of terrorism, DHS created Centers of
Excellence to “bring together leading experts and researchers to conduct
multidisciplinary research and education for homeland security solutions”
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(Department of Homeland Security [DHS], 2008, ¶ 1). One of these
centers, the National Center for Food Protection and Defense (NCFPD),
was established to address “the vulnerability of the nation’s food system
to attack through intentional contamination with biological or chemical
agents” (National Center for Food Protection and Defense [NCFPD], 2008a,
¶ 1). The risk communication sector of the NCFPD was assigned the task
of establishing best practices for “active engagement of multiple audiences
in effective risk communications prior to, during and after potentially
catastrophic food bioterrorism incidents” (NCFPD, 2008b, ¶1).
Drawing primarily on the work of Vincent Covello (1992; 2003), Peter
Sandman (1993), Matthew Seeger (2006), and Barbara Reynolds (2002) at
the Centers for Disease Control, and on research conducted by the Risk and
Crisis Communication Project (a network of risk and crisis communication
scholars), the best practices were developed through a series of case
studies involving crisis and risk communication that included anecdotal
observations, experience in crisis response, and media analysis (Seeger). An
expert panel at the NCFPD then reviewed, critiqued, adjusted, and refined
the practices to a final version of the nine best practices which, since this
study was conducted, has expanded to include a 10th best practice (Seeger).
The nine best practices at the time of this study were classified into strategic
planning (planning pre-event logistics, coordinating networks, accepting
uncertainty), proactive strategies (forming partnerships, listening to public
concern, being open and honest), and strategic response (being accessible
to the media, communicating compassion, providing self-efficacy) (Figure).
The 10th practice incorporates all strategies in the form of recommending
continuous evaluation and updating of crisis plans through process
approaches and policy development.
This study was part of an ongoing effort to extend and refine the DHSNCFPD best practices model. Researchers investigated the potential for the
best practices model to foster benchmarks for learning from crisis situations.
Specifically, the best practices model was used to guide the postcrisis review
of a bovine anthrax outbreak mitigated by the Biosurveillance Working
Group, a unified cohort of veterinarians, Extension agents, and university
researchers.
This study introduces the best practices model as a resource for
organizational learning and crisis planning and demonstrates how the model
can be used to evaluate crisis planning and response efforts.
Learning Through Crisis
Organizational crisis is defined as “a specific, unexpected, and
nonroutine event or series of events that create high levels of uncertainty and
76 / Journal of Applied Communications
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Figure. The best practices in risk communication developed for NCFPD.

threat or perceived threat to an organization’s high priority goals” (Seeger,
Sellnow, & Ulmer, 1998, p. 233). Despite its typically negative connotation,
a crisis can also be characterized as an unexpected turning point in an
organization that can have a negative or positive outcome (Fink, 1986;
Gottschalk, 1993; Lerbinger, 1997; Mitroff, 1988; Ray, 1999; Seeger et al., 1998;
Seeger et al., 2003; Sellnow, 1993).
As an unplanned opportunity, crisis can be viewed as a trigger point
to a valuable organizational learning process (Murphy, 1996). Through the
natural system of renewal, crisis can effectively purge system elements
that are outdated and inappropriate and create new and unexpected
opportunities for an organization (Seeger et al., 2003). This natural
process has been described as an awakening. “The things we fear most in
organizations—disruptions, confusion, chaos—need not be interpreted
as signs that we are about to be destroyed. Instead, these conditions
are necessary to awaken creativity” (Wheatley, 1999, p. 21). For some
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organizations, crisis is less a gentle awakening and more a lightning bolt
as it shocks organizational systems out of complacency. By acting as a
stimulus for improving the organization and by legitimizing the need for
transformation, crisis prepares members of an organization for change by
reducing resistance and thereby heightening consideration of alternate
strategies (Lerbinger, 1997). Huber (1991) notes that “[a]n entity learns if,
through its processing of information, the range of its potential behaviors
is changed” (p. 88) and argues that the more an organization changes as a
result of an event, the more the organization has learned.
Simply put, organizational learning is a process of detecting and
correcting errors (Argyris, 1982). Learning occurs when errors are identified,
shared, and analyzed. This learning experience is then used by the
organization to enact changes in standard operating procedures (Popper
& Lipshitz, 2000). Senge (1990) posits that organizations should adapt in
response to difficulties by using feedback to “change the thinking that
produced the problem in the first place” (p. 95). Prototypical learning occurs
during postproject reviews in which the organization reviews a process or
event to determine what procedures were successful and what procedures
need to be corrected (Caroll, 1995; Di Bella, Nevis, & Gould, 1996). This
review process can, and often does, involve comparing an organization’s
actions against what are considered the best practices for the given context
(Seeger, 2006).
Best practices as a mechanism for learning.
The identification of best practices has been associated with
benchmarking (Kyro, 2004), whereby organizations seek to identify and
replicate best practices of other organizations (Camp, 1989; Compton, 1992;
Zairi, 1998). When used strategically, this comparison of best practices
can offer optimal organizational procedures. However, if they are not
continuously evaluated and improved, best practices can become outdated
and detrimental (Bergman, Yassine, & Roemer, 2004). Using best practices in
risk communication in a postcrisis evaluation not only tests the usefulness of
the model, but also provides a learning experience and helps organizations
determine how to improve future planning and response efforts.
Case studies examining failure are abundant in crisis communication
literature (Baum & Oliver, 1992; Brinson & Benoit, 1999; Dacin, 1997;
Englehardt, Sallot, & Springston, 2001; Hearit, 1995; Ice, 1991; Massey,
2001; Ruef & Scott, 1998; Seeger et al., 1998). By using best practices in risk
communication to examine a case, organizations can evaluate their crisis
response strategies as well as any pre-event procedures that may have led to
the crisis.
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The Anthrax Case
In October 2004, a livestock producer in Dunn County, North Dakota,
discovered two head of cattle had died in his pasture. Multiple breakdowns
in communication and procedure delayed the confirmation of the cause
of death as anthrax. In the 2 weeks following the initial deaths—amidst
confusion, contamination concerns, and confidentiality leaks—the producer
lost a total of 15 head of cattle (Rafferty & Donovan, 2004), which is the
equivalent of almost $20,000 (United States Department of Agriculture, 2006).
Anthrax is endemic in North Dakota, and the number of confirmed
cases each year ranges from a couple to a couple hundred depending on
the moisture levels in the ground. However, the deaths occurred in a region
with no previously reported cases of anthrax. In addition, anthrax is rarely
reported in the cooler months of the year. After consulting a veterinarian
from the local research Extension center, the producer initially suspected a
nutrition-related problem. Cattle continued to die even after being removed
from the pasture. The following week, the producer called additional
veterinarians and a university researcher who worked with Extension.
Anthrax was then discussed as a potential cause. Because the producer was
informed that the diagnostic lab would not run blood tests over the weekend,
he waited until the following week to take in samples. No treatment was
administered while awaiting confirmation.
The producer, concerned for his family’s safety, turned to the Internet
for information over the weekend. Post-9/11 reports of the anthrax terrorist
attacks flooded his search results. Having no familiarity with bovine anthrax,
the producer did not allow his daughter to leave the house for fear she might
contract anthrax from the contaminated cattle. That same weekend, the
rumor that anthrax was discovered in Dunn County had already reached an
Extension meeting in a county on the other side of the state.
The state veterinarian was first notified following the Extension
meeting—a full 2 weeks after the first cases were discovered. The next
day, the diagnostic lab ran the blood samples and confirmed that the cattle
had anthrax. The dead cattle were burned and buried, and the remaining
cattle in the herd were treated. The anthrax outbreak had been contained,
but the Biosurveillance Working Group responsible for the crisis response
recognized there was a breakdown in communication and protocol that
delayed the response.
Methods
While much of the literature dealing with crisis and organizational
learning is geared toward corporations, by defining an organization
as a unified cohort of decision-makers, the literature can be applied to
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universities, government agencies, and in this case, veterinarians, Extension
agents, and university researchers brought together by a common goal. The
Biosurveillance Working Group was established as part of a USDA Federal
Relations Grant to review crisis-level livestock diseases with the stated
goals of enhancing diagnostic capabilities, efficiently locating and working
livestock, supporting field investigations, and improving communication.
During a Biosurveillance Working Group meeting at the USDA
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) office in Bismarck
the following April, researchers with the NCFPD used the best practices in
risk communication to guide an exploratory analysis of the anthrax case.
The method was naturalistic (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) in that the researchers
adopted “strategies that parallel how people act in the course of daily
life” (Taylor & Bogdan, 1998, p.8). Because postproject reviews in which
the organization evaluates an event to determine the effectiveness of its
procedures are common in the field (Caroll, 1995; Di Bella et al., 1996),
participants could feel comfortable revealing work-related information
(Taylor & Bogdan).
Participants
Most participants were selected based on their involvement with the
Biosurveillance Working Group. They included three Extension agents,
three university researchers, three veterinarians from the state office, two
veterinarians from USDA-APHIS, and one representative from Manitoba
Agriculture and Food. While not a member of the Biosurveillance Working
Group, the representative from Manitoba Agriculture and Food was invited
to provide insight as to how anthrax cases are handled across the border. All
members of the group were present either in person or via teleconference.
Participation in the discussion was voluntary and the decision to
participate in the study did not affect the standing of the participants in the
Biosurveillance Working Group. If individuals decided not to participate,
they were free to withdraw consent and discontinue participation at any
time. Those participating in the discussion signed an informed consent form
allowing the procedure to be recorded and studied. Permission to collect data
was obtained from the relevant institutional review board.
Interview Guide
An interview guide was used to assure all aspects of the model would
be discussed (Kvale, 1996). Moderators used open-ended questions that did
not inhibit the participants from divulging more information than what was
requested. Questions were based on the best practices in risk communication
(Seeger, 2006). As each practice was introduced, the participants were asked
80 / Journal of Applied Communications
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to relate what they had or had not done in the anthrax case that correlated
with the practice. Additional inquiry was made when necessary to encourage
clarification and elaboration (Spradley, 1979).
Procedures for Data Collection and Analysis
Thematic analysis techniques were used to analyze recurring themes
within the data (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). The best practices in risk
communication developed by NCFPD were used as the criterion-referenced,
or anchored, material (Boyatzis, 1998). To analyze the data, researchers first
followed Lincoln and Guba’s (1985) recommendation to create a schema in
notes while moderating the discussion. While the themes naturally followed
the model guiding the discussion, the researchers noted each time comments
reverted to a previously discussed practice. Next, away from the interview
environment, verbatim transcripts and notes were carefully and repeatedly
reviewed for themes relating to best practices other than those being
discussed at that time so as to determine relationships among the themes
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967). The transcripts and notes were then reviewed for
barriers to the best practices. In each segment, the researchers looked for
negative comments referencing the practice. For example, if participants
listed reasons why they could not have adhered to that particular practice
in the anthrax case, those reasons constituted a barrier to accepting that
practice. Lastly, to ensure the reliability of this process, a research assistant
analyzed the notes and 20% of the transcripts to determine if the same
relationships and barriers were found in the data. The researchers and the
assistant agreed upon each occurrence of the themes in the sample data.
Results
The discussion followed the order depicted by the DHS-NCFPD
model (Figure). The findings indicate the Biosurveillance Working Group
recognized the presence of the best practices in risk communication. As each
practice was introduced, the participants were able to relate what they had
or had not done in the anthrax case with regard to each practice. Discussion
time was evenly distributed among the three broad categories of strategic
planning, proactive strategies, and strategic responses. The discussion
regarding strategic planning was more holistic in that as the participants
discussed planning pre-event logistics, coordinating networks, and accepting
uncertainty, they consistently referred to the other categories, demonstrating
the connectivity of the three practices. While references were made to other
practices throughout the discussion, the connectivity of the practices was not
as prominent as it was during strategic planning discussions.
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Accepting uncertainty, listening to public concern, and being accessible
to the media were not initially seen as priorities for the test group. Discussion
regarding the presence of uncertainty was followed by discussion about
how to remove uncertainty from the process. The discussion pointed to
uncertainty as a barrier in the flow of communication for the Biosurveillance
Working Group. Listening to public concern and being accessible to the
media were discussed secondarily in that the most essential task at hand was
dealing with the outbreak rather than what people were saying about the
outbreak. The other practices were discussed without negative comments.
Throughout the discussion, three themes emerged as barriers to the
best practices in risk communication: a) lack of education on the process of
disease mitigation, b) ambiguity in the acceptable communication protocol,
and c) fear of repercussions based on action or inaction following a trigger
point. While other barriers were discussed, including short response time
and geographical distance, these barriers were not seen as surmountable by
adhering to best practices or enhanced communication protocols and are
therefore outside the realm of this study.
Pre-Event Logistics
In discussing pre-event logistics, participants sought to determine the
trigger point to activate disease mitigation procedures. Discussion revealed
that individuals within the mitigation network recognized different triggers,
depending on experience with a particular disease in a geographic location.
Participants did not agree on a single trigger point and recognized a need
for education on determining trigger points in enacting the mitigation
process. A veterinarian commented about why a producer might not contact
a veterinarian when needed: “That would probably be lack of awareness of
what may be going on in the area or lack of awareness of what the symptoms
are.” Participants described Extension agents as essential to the education
system that ensures producers are aware of potential diseases in the area.
However, the Extension agents participating in the discussion stated they
were unaware of the trigger points.
A major barrier identified in establishing a predetermined trigger point
was that there was no protocol to follow in the case of a disease outbreak,
and if a protocol did exist, those involved in the mitigation process were not
aware of it. A university researcher commented:
That was one question we asked of the Extension director, and his
response was, you give us a protocol to follow, and that’s what the
agents will do.… If we had the same trigger points that we just listed
here, and that went into a protocol to Extension agents, whether they
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were nutritionists, Extensionists, or veterinarians, or whatever, that
might help.
As the discussion progressed, the state veterinarian produced a book of
statutes explaining which diseases should be reported to state and federal
veterinarians; however, the participants stated that they were unaware of the
statutes.
Coordinating Networks
Participants associated the coordination of networks with establishing
pre-event logistics. Participants felt that the communication protocol in
the disease mitigation process was ambiguous, in that multiple routes of
communication could be taken from the producer to the state veterinarian,
including routes through local veterinarians, free veterinarians, multiple
individuals within Extension services, and technicians at the diagnostic
lab. Because some producers in remote areas do not have a veterinarian
within a 150-mile radius, multiple people may be contacted and crucial
time may be lost before a disease is diagnosed. The participants viewed the
multiple communication routes as a barrier to mitigating the disease quickly.
A university researcher commented, “They [the veterinarians] may be,
oftentimes, a long ways away. Therefore, you get more people in that, just by
necessity, there are more people that get involved and muddy up the chain.”
In assessing this particular anthrax case, another university researcher stated:
I don’t think there was any flow. I think it was just a haphazard
combination of people being visited….. I’m not trying to be negative,
I’m just saying, I think that compilation of contacts is not in an
organized manner.
The producer must start the mitigation process by following one of the
routes of communication within the established networks. However, the
participants were concerned that fear might inhibit producers from reporting
a disease. A veterinarian said:
I was just going to say, maybe, when we are talking about other
things that might inhibit people from reporting previously, and
I think fear might be part of that, too; in that, what if there is
something truly going on here and the federal government comes
along and kills all my cows because I have a highly contagious
disease?
Just as fear might prevent the producer from contacting a veterinarian,
so too may fear affect whether or not a veterinarian acts in the event of a
potentially dangerous disease. A veterinarian said, “We’ve never required
that the lab confirm it [a field diagnosis]; we went ahead and quarantined
Journal of Applied Communications / 83
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and recommended vaccinating.” Without lab verification of a disease, the
producer may experience undue expenses if the veterinarian makes an
incorrect field diagnosis. At the same time, a correct field diagnosis can save
crucial time that would have been spent waiting for lab results. If, however,
the veterinarian does not report a disease because he or she is uncertain of
the severity of the situation, he or she may face repercussions. A veterinarian
commented, “There, again, this is like developing something like the best
management processes so that you end up being the one responsible for
not having reported something.” While the participants agreed that a
veterinarian must accept uncertainty at some level to determine when to
report a disease, they viewed this practice as an unfortunate byproduct of a
crisis.
Accepting Uncertainty
The participants also recognized uncertainty as a potential trigger
point. A university researcher stated, “To me, maybe a trigger point is
when you’ve got producers, the veterinarian, or anyone else involved
uncertain as to what the next thing to do is. They should contact someone
to help them with making that decision.” Uncertainty was also seen as
a barrier in the flow of communication for the Biosurveillance Working
Group by providing multiple routes of communication from the producer
to the state veterinarian. One veterinarian commented that the multiple
routes of communication they encourage to ease the flow of information
actually increase the uncertainty in the communication process. Regardless
of the Biosurveillance Working Group’s dislike for uncertainty in strategic
planning, the participants did recognize that most crises inherently involve
uncertainty.
Forming Partnerships
It was evident that the many different individuals involved in the
process between the time the producer discovered the situation and the time
word reached the state veterinarian (such as local veterinarians, veterinarian
medical officers, and Extension agents) were essential in gathering the
information required for mitigation. Because the producer may be unsure
of the process and may be apprehensive about what could happen if a
communicable disease were to be found in the herd, he or she may feel
more comfortable working with local sources rather than involving the state
veterinarian. When asked if a producer would contact the state veterinarian,
the state veterinarian’s answer was, “It is very unlikely. Clients who call
do not tell you everything. They are fearful of what might happen. I just
refer them back to their local vet.” The participants agreed that without the
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partnerships between individuals who the producer deems trustworthy and
the state veterinarian’s office, some diseases would go unreported. Once a
disease has been confirmed, however, there is direct communication from
the state veterinarian’s office to the local veterinarian and producer. The
state veterinarian said, “Rather than reporting it down through the masses
and turning it into gossip, you pull it up, and then there is a decision there.”
The participants stated that everything is urgent to the producer, so having a
short communication route helps reduce unwarranted concern.
Listening to Public Concern
The Biosurveillance Working Group did not initially consider listening
to public concern to be part of its role in mitigating a disease outbreak. A
veterinarian said, “Our decisions are probably not influenced by public
concern because we are just doing what we know needs to be done.”
When it was discovered that the previously discussed producer would
not allow his daughter to leave the house because he was afraid she might
contract anthrax, the discussion turned to how the Biosurveillance Working
Group can strengthen partnerships with public health services to provide
information as to whether or not bovine diseases can infect humans. The
participants expressed concern that by providing that sort of information,
they would overstep their bounds and take on the role of caring for the
producer’s health, when their actual role is to care for the animals.
Being Open and Honest
While the participants all agreed there is no reason to hide information,
the fear of inciting panic caused some to question how much to say. A
university researcher commented:
It was a fear of mine in this particular case; surely, you don’t want
to cause panic out there. Because, do we know what panic in this
particular case we’re talking about? I know it went through my mind
Sunday evening when I heard about it. I don’t want people to panic
because of the fact that we have a case here.
A veterinarian said, “You’ve either reported too much, in somebody’s
mind, or you’ve reported too little, and a lot of that, there again, has to do
with the level of what you know about the situation.” The participants
became even more guarded when the media were asking questions.
Being Accessible to the Media
The participants viewed the media as a resource for disseminating
essential information. A veterinarian said, “We have a responsibility to
the health system to let people know immediately…quarantine or to stop
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rumors.” However, in the anthrax case, the story was not released to the
media until the middle of November. In the article, the state veterinarian
said she chose not to publicize the information right away in order to avoid
an unnecessary scare. Being accessible to the media was not considered a
priority. A veterinarian said:
Really, it is more important that you are spending all your time and
effort on communicating to people you need to and not on press
releases. And we’re trying to delegate that within our department so
that we don’t talk to and visit with the media on the phone, and have
a preplanned press release for review.
According to the Biosurveillance Working Group, the media usually
want a local twist, so they contact local veterinarians or Extension
agents instead of using comments from the state office. Extension agents
commented that there is no guarantee media calls will be returned. No
guidelines are in place for who should and should not speak to the media;
however, at the time of the meeting, they had not experienced any bad
publicity due to individuals responding to reporters.
Communicating Compassion
After discussing the case of the producer who feared for the safety of
his family, the discussion on communicating compassion was very short.
The Biosurveillance Working Group understood it was a very difficult time
for the producer in question. An Extension agent stated, “These people
are suffering. They didn’t necessarily bring this upon themselves. It’s a
misfortune.” Neighbors are often concerned about their own well-being. The
participants said they try to educate neighbors to alleviate their concerns;
however, the outcome is not always positive. A veterinarian said, “It doesn’t
always go the way you want, because once you give the information, you
can’t control it. . . . They [the neighbors] called meetings; they had several
town hall-like meetings.”
The representative from Manitoba Agriculture and Food experienced a
worse scenario in another case:
It went so far as people with connected farms were not welcome
to come to church. If you ever needed to go to church…when your
property is populated with whatever animal disease, that’s a time
when you need your church community the worst. And they were
not welcome at church, and neighbors would phone up and disinvite
their children to things like birthday parties because they’re farmers.
Considering the potential repercussions associated with reporting
a livestock disease, the Biosurveillance Working Group indicated that it
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understood why so many producers are afraid to initiate the call to start the
mitigation process. The participants saw communicating compassion as an
essential role, though it may not be one they are qualified to play.
Providing Self-Efficacy
The Biosurveillance Working Group discussed how giving producers
something meaningful to do can help alleviate some of the fears brought
on by a disease. In this anthrax case, participants found that it was best to
allow the producer to communicate with neighbors as a form of self-efficacy,
thereby reducing concern and backlash from neighbors and providing a
learning opportunity for the surrounding ranching community. An Extension
agent said, “The producer went from wanting to hide the fact that they were
buying penicillin, to calling neighbors as they got more comfortable with
what was happening and knew more about it.” Other procedures, including
cleaning and disinfecting, vaccinating, and coordinating records, were
discussed. The participants also recognized how surrounding producers
stepped up disease mitigation efforts, including using radio frequency
identification (RFID) tags to track cattle. An Extension agent said:
Some of the producers are resisting traceability with RFIDs and those
kinds of things, and this particular producer said to me, he said, after
you’ve explained this to me, if you need somebody to speak up for
the fact that we need to do a better job with RFIDs, he said, I’ll be
more than willing to do it. Because, he said, that’s evidence that we
need to be able to follow them [the cattle].
Continuously Evaluating and Updating Crisis Plans
The remainder of the discussion centered on how the Biosurveillance
Working Group was going to proceed in updating the mitigation process.
Suggestions were made to create a communication flow chart and a set of
best practices specific to the Biosurveillance Working Group. A veterinarian
commented, “I think we have a list of good ideas and possibilities we might
do differently next time and prepare for it.” Other suggestions included
educational meetings organized by Extension agents to help alleviate
uncertainty and fear. Though the best practice of continuously evaluating
and updating crisis plans was not part of the discussion, the Biosurveillance
Working Group embraced this practice, as was evident in the group’s
willingness to evaluate the crisis in order to improve its processes.
Discussion
Although the best practices in risk communication established at the
time of the meeting were all discussed in this case, participants did not
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view accepting uncertainty as a best practice and did not initially view
listening to public concern and being accessible to the media as priorities.
The Biosurveillance Working Group repeatedly discussed how to remove
uncertainty from the process and pointed to the practice as a barrier in the
flow of communication. The group also determined the most essential task
at hand was dealing with the outbreak, rather than dealing with what people
were saying about the outbreak. Seeger (2006) contends that accepting
some level of uncertainty is critical, as warnings are often needed before
the full nature of the harm is known. “Organizations must demonstrate
respect, concern, commitment, and aligned interests with the concerned
publics” (Heath, 2006, p. 246). The state veterinarian specifically cited
not wanting to create a scare as the reason why she waited to report the
case to the media, but withholding information from the public actually
decreases the probability that it will respond appropriately (Sandman
& Lanard, 2004). Venette (2006) notes that many of the best practices are
counterintuitive: “When pressure to present accurate, timely information is
high, the tendencies to guard information, over-reassure the public, and deny
responsibility often increase”(p. 230).
Three themes emerged as barriers to the best practices: a) lack of
education on the process of disease mitigation, b) ambiguity in the acceptable
communication protocol, and c) fear of repercussions based on action or
inaction following a trigger point. Seeger (2006) notes, “…if information
about a crisis is not shared openly by the organization engaged in the crisis,
the public will obtain information from other sources” (p. 239). Sandman
(2006) stresses the importance of acknowledging fear in risk and crisis: “If the
crisis itself arouses fear—as it often does—the job of the crisis communicator
is to help us bear our fear, and to guide the choice of precautionary actions
our fear motivates” (p. 258). To address the barriers identified in the
discussion and standardize communication (Bergman et al., 2004; Cohen
& Sproull, 1996), the Biosurveillance Working Group intends to create a
communication flow chart and a set of best practices specific to the disease
mitigation process.
The Biosurveillance Working Group took part in a prototypical
postproject review to determine what procedures were successful and what
procedures needed to be corrected (Caroll, 1995; Di Bella et al., 1996). The
discussion of the anthrax case acted as a stimulus for change (Huber, 1991;
Lerbinger, 1997; Seeger et al., 2003), and the participants were strategically
adaptive in learning from the failures illuminated by the discussion (Argyris,
1982; Senge, 1990; Sitkin, 1996).
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Conclusions
Evaluating best practices allows an organization to learn from failures
and crises by establishing alternative strategies and thereby potentially
preventing future crises. When used strategically, best practices can
offer optimal organizational procedures. This study suggests that the
DHS-NCFPD best practices for risk communication offer a means for
organizations to engage in a thoughtful and thorough postcrisis evaluation of
their communication. In doing so, a crisis event can serve as a turning point,
as it did for the Biosurveillance Working Group. Organizations from all
genres can make use of this best practices model to facilitate positive change
in response to crises.
For agriculture educators and communicators, this case study can serve
not only as an example of how to use the best practices model in a postcrisis
review, but also as a vicarious learning tool for veterinarians and Extension
agents. We cannot assume all veterinarians, Extension agents, and university
researchers understand the necessity of accepting uncertainty, listening
to public concern, and being accessible to the media based on this case.
Potential barriers to adhering to the best practices in risk communication
have now been identified. This case demonstrates that communication is
essential in disease mitigation and can be used to support education and
research collaboration with veterinary and Extension services.
To prevent livestock markets around the world from plummeting
due to naturally occurring livestock disease outbreaks and the potential
of agroterrorist attacks, organizations within the high-risk industry of
agriculture need to examine disease mitigation processes. And as our world
continues to become more uncertain and complicated, other organizations
should embrace the opportunities to learn by assessing past cases and
the experiences of similar organizations. By evaluating a crisis using best
practices as a benchmarking procedure, an organization can not only
determine problems within the system, but also identify strategies that do
not align with established recommendations.
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